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Property Rights Between Unmarried Cohabitants
Despite varying degrees of social disapproval, illicit cohabitation
has always been more attractive than marriage to some couples. When
entering into such an arrangement, however, couples seldom consider
the consequences of an eventual separation. When disputes have arisen
concerning the rightful ownership of property acquired during an illicit
cohabitation, courts have not provided orderly and predictable resolu-
tions. They have been torn by the conflict between their duty to provide
peaceful arbitration of disputes, preventing unjust and perhaps violent
resolutions, and their perceived responsibility to preserve morality by
not sanctioning a practice which is morally offensive to a large segment
of society.' Courts sometimes turn their backs on illicit cohabitants,
preferring to deny relief rather than "dirty their hands." When courts
have ruled on the merits, the extent of the intervention has been limited.
Thus, the number of cases in which satisfactory relief has been afforded
is small.
The scope of this note is twofold. First, it will suggest ways in
which parties to an illicit cohabitation can minimize the possibility of
disputes. Second, it will analyze the manner in whici courts have tradi-
tionally resolved disputes over the rightful ownership of property and
will offer suggestions for improving this process.
'Many judges have spoken directly or indirectly of this tension, often reflecting their
moral revulsion toward the practice:
We are here confronted with a situation in which good morals would offer
no brief in behalf of either party. In fact, if it were possible we would be in-
dined to dismiss them both with the Shakespearean denunciation "A plague
o'[n] both your houses !" However, we are compelled by precedent to reverse
the decree of the Chancellor. We do so reluctantly because the appellant Joe is
lucky that he isn't in jail for the crime of adultery and in our view the manner
in which he concluded the affair is reprehensible. By the same token the ap-
pellee Julia Mae has little in the way of good morals to commend her to the
conscience of equity.
Smith v. Smith, 108 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 1959) (brackets in original).
Generally the conscience of the court is not aroused to invoke equitable
powers to rescue those from the results of their illegal practices when that is
the only basis for granting relief. The parties here not only violated the per-
manent established public policy of all society but also violated the expressed
criminal statutes of the state of Arizona. . . .
We cannot establish the precedent of assisting those who deliberately choose
to substitute illegal cohabitation for lawful wedlock, especially when the only
basis for such assistance is the mere fact that they have chcsen such a status.
Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 335-36, 256 P.2d 712, 715 (1953).
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PREVENTIO OF DISPUTES
A system of laws is concerned with both resolving disputes and
minimizing the number of disputes that arise. The adage "an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure" is particularly appropriate when
considering the thorny problems that may arise when illicit cohabitation
terminates.
Disputes over the ownership of property acquired during the re-
lationship may arise in two ways: the parties may separate voluntarily;
or one party may die.' Property disputes could be minimized if couples
initially would agree to a procedure for its orderly disposition. Courts
generally enforce these agreements:
If a man and woman live together as husband and wife under an
agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint
accumulations, equity will protect the interests of each in such
property.8
While parol agreements have been enforced, a written agreement
is preferable. The primary drawback of a parol agreement is the
difficulty in pro4ing its existence. In many cases conflicting testimony
is offered;' moreover, if one party is deceased a Dead Man's Statute
may prevent the survivor's testimony.'
The practice of entering into private law agreements finds its
counterpart in antenuptial agreements. These agreements establish ex
contractu rights between spouses upon dissolution of the marriage.
They effectively circumvent the public law resolution dictated by divorce
statutes.8 Illicit cohabitants could adopt similar private law agreements
20f course parties to an illicit cohabitation could grant the surviving party a legal
interest in his or her estate. Cohabitation atone, however, will not give a surviving party
any interest in the estate. The draftsman of an agreement between illicit cohabitants
for the disposition of property should be careful to avoid possible Statute of Wills prob-
lems that arise when a gift of property is made contingent upon death.
8 Vallera v. Vallera, 21 'Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943).4 See Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962) ; Willis
v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1955).
5 See Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 110 Adv. Cal. App. 623, 243 P.2d 561
(1952). For a typical Dead Man's Statute see IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-1-14-6 (Code ed.
1973) :
In suits or proceedings in which an executor or administrator is a party,
involving matters which occurred during the lifetime of the decedent, . . . any
person who is a necessary party to the issue or record, whose interest is adverse
to such estate, shall not be a competent witness as to such matters against such
estate ....
G While these agreements were .originally designed to take effect upon the death of
a spouse, recent cases have upheld agreements contemplating divorce. E.g., Posner v.
Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) :
With divorce such a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume that
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to avoid unpredictable and frequently inequitable public law treatment.
Several approaches to private agreements may be used. An obvious
advantage of private agreements is their adaptability to the needs and
expectations of the parties.7 For example, an agrecment could minimize
the commingling of assets by specifying the property contributed by
each party. If both parties have independent incomes, the agreement
could specify the extent to which the incomes would be pooled. If the
parties plan to become business partners, the agreement could delineate
their respective rights and duties. Further, if either party intends to
assume a domestic role, the agreement could assign value to those ser-
vices. In the event of a dispute, an agreement could provide for
arbitration.8 Finally, the parties, in contemplation of the dissolution of
the relationship through death, might plan the distribution of their
estates. The possibilities are endless. The point is to realize that, with
foresight, parties contemplating cohabitation witfout marriage could
fashion an agreement which would meet their needs and expectations
while avoiding the unpredictable and inadequate public law result.
A common impediment to the enforcement of agreements between
cohabitants is the defense of illegality.' Illicit cohebitation is ,illegal in
most states," and against public policy in others.1' A contract is unen-
many prospective marriage partners whose property and familial situation is
such as to generate a valid antenuptial agreement settling their property rights
upon the death of either, might want to consider and discuss also-and agree
upon, if possible-the disposition of their property and the .limony rights of the
wife in the event their marriage, despite their best efforts, should fail.
7 People who illicitly cohabit cover a wide spectrum of souiety spanning both class
and age barriers. While the typical stereotype is the college-age, counter-culture type,
the cases indicate that at least among those couples who end up in court, the length of
the cohabitation is commonly more than ten years with joint as ;ets sometimes exceeding
$50,000. Also consider the increasingly common practice of unmarried senior citizens
living together to avoid a reduction in Social Security benefits.
8 Fifteen states, including Indiana, have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act. Am.
JuPL 2D DEsK Booi, Doc. No. 129 (Supp. 1974). IND. ANN. SiAT. § 34-4-2-1 (Code ed.
1973) provides:
A written agreement to submit to arbitration . . . an existing controversy
or a controversy thereafter arising is valid and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. If the
parties to such an agreement so stipulate in writing, the agreement may be en-
forced by designated third persons, who shall in such instances have the same
rights as a party under this act. This act also applies to arbitration agreements
between employers and employees or between their re3pectve representa-
tives ....
9 RESTATEMENT OF CONT ACrS § 589 (1932) provides:
A bargain in whole or part for or in consideration of illicit sexual inter-
course is illegal; but subject to this exception such intercourse between parties
to a bargain previously or subsequently formed does not inw'iidate it.
2 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 269a (West 1970) ; IDAHO CODE § 18-6604 (1948);
IND. CODE § 35-1-82-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4207 (1956 Repl.); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2151 (1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 944107 (1969).
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forceable when all or part of the consideration is conduct which is
illegal or contrary to public policy. Corbin states:
A bargain between two persons is not made illegal by the mere fact
of an illicit relationship between them, so long as that relationship
constitutes no part of the consideration bargained for and no
promise in the bargain is conditional upon it. . . . Agreements
made by the parties with respect to money or property are enforce-
able if they are quite independent of the illicit relationship.22
With notable exceptions courts have enforced such agreements,
avoiding the defense of illegality by finding that the agreement was free
of illicit consideration," or that equity required judicial intervention."4
In Bridges v. Bridges 5 the parties had acquired both real and personal
property during their six years of cohabitation. When they separated,
the woman sued alleging an oral contract to pool assets and share ac-
cumulations. The man contended the agreement was illegal and thus
unenforceable. The court disagreed:
Nowhere is it expressly testified to by anyone that there was any-
thing in the agreement for the pooling of assets and the sharing of
accumulations that contemplated meretricious relations as any part
of the consideration or as any object of the agreement.'a6
Illegality has been unsuccessfully raised as a defense to a variety
of agreements including those to pool earnings and share property,"7
Kinsey described the general attitude of the average person toward sex laws:
The sex laws and the upper level persons who defend them are simply hazards
about which one has to learn to find his way. Like the rough spots in a side-
walk, or the traffic on a street, the sex laws are things that one learns to nego-
tiate without getting into much trouble; but that is no reason why one should
not walk on sidewalks, or cross streets, or have sexual relations.
A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 391(1948).
11 See Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Willis v. Willis, 48
Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935).
126A A. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACtS § 1476, at 622 (1962) (footnote omitted).
13E.g., Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Garcia v.
Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
14 "Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Loughran
v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934). See also Mitchell v. Fish, 97 Ark. 444, 134
S.W.2d 940 (1911), and Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618, 622, 32 So. 2d 273, 275
(1947), where the court analogized: "One might recoil under the knowledge that an-
other's home was paid for with the proceeds of bootleg liquor but there is no theory
under the law that it could be confiscated for that reason."
15 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954).
'16 Id. at 363, 270 P.2d at 71.
'7 Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954) ; Garcia v. Venegas,
106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
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partnerships,"8 and resulting trusts. 9 A notable s.uccessful use of the
defense is Welhmaker z. Roberts," where a couple decided to build a
house and live together. It was agreed that the woman would finance the
construction and that the man would provide the labor. After com-
pleting the house, the man breached the agreement and began living
with another woman. The first woman sued in contract for return of
her money. The court denied relief because part of the consideration
under the contract was a promise to cohabit illicitly. The illegality
defense which was raised by the man and accepted by the court resulted
in a windfall for the man and penalized the woman. While this case
appears to be the exception rather than the rule, it highlights the in-
equitable results of recognizing the defense of illegality.
By initially agreeing to the disposition of acquired property, one
party will be unable to contend that what began as an illicit relationship
has since matured into a common law marriage. 1 Common law marriage
could be used as either a sword or a shield. If a common law marriage
exists, disposition of property is prescribed by divorce law, which could
mean a sizable increase in an individual's claimY Thus, if one party
suspects the disposition of property under the divorce law would be
more generous, he could take the offensive by petitioning for divorce."
18 Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P.2d 260 (1960).
19 Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618, 32 So. 2d 273 (1947).
20213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 (1958).
21 A general definition of common law marriage is provdied in H. CLARK, JR., THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1968):
In theory there is general agreement among American cases as to the re-
quirements for a valid common law marriage. These include, in addition to
bare present consent . . . a mutual assumption of the marital relationship.
Or, as some cases put it, not only must there be a present agreement to be man
and wife, but the parties must "hold themselves out" to the world as married,
or they must publicly and professedly live as husband and wife.
Id. § 2.4, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). Other commentators have been less willing to
advance a general definition.
A valid definition of common law marriage without infinite qualifications can
hardly be found. All we have are approximations which dcmonstrate ambiguous
and vacillating notions of some more or less informal kind of marital status.
Whatever hazy notions we have vary not only from jurisciction to jurisdiction
but from case to case within a recognizing jurisdiction . . . . Again, the shades
of non-recognition may vary from case to case. A good deal may depend on
how the issue comes up.
Weyrauch, Informal and Fornal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organi-
-ation, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 88, 91 (1960) (footnote omitted). See also Stein, Common-
Law Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems, 9 J. FAm. L. 271
(1969).
22For example, under the divorce laws alimony might be awarded. In community
property states community property would be created, while in other states a "fair and
equitable" division of property would occur. These resolution3 are not afforded illicit
cohabitants.23See, e.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
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Conversely, if a party seeks a partition and settlement of property,
the other, who suspects that divorce laws provide a more generous dis-
position of property, could raise the existence of a common law marriage
as a defense." The doctrine of common law marriage will seldom pro-
vide conclusive determinations of the rights in property acquired during
illicit cohabitation and will surely give rise to many judicial headaches.
A well-drafted agreement would foreclose the possibility that the issue
would ever be raised.
It is hoped that parties to an illicit relationship will use foresight
in their dealings. However, in many cases the nature of the relationship
makes it doubtful that they will. Thus the remainder of this inquiry
will focus upon the judicial resolution of disputes over ownership of
property acquired during illicit cohabitation.
JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
Shortcomings of Traditional Approaches
While judicial intervention in the affairs of illicit cohabitants has
Similarly, where one party is deceased, the survivor, by claiming common law marriage,
could pursue his or her rights as a surviving spouse.
24 Fourteen states and the District of Columbia recognize cominon law marriage.
See H. CLARK, supra note 21, § 2.4, at 45 n.9 (1968). In the remaining jurisdictions,
common law marriage has been abolished by case law or statute. However, in many of
these jurisdictions the doctrine survives in several ways. In some states people living
together are presumed to be legally married. In Indiana, the General Assembly declared
common law marriages "null and void." IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-6-1 (Code ed. 1973).
Nevertheless, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled the statute inapplicable in Reger v. Reger,
242 Ind. 302, 316, 177 N.E.2d 901, 907 (1961),
[w]here the parties in good faith have gone through the legal formalities neces-
sary to consummate a marriage and through innocent ignorance they are unaware
of a legal impediment that exists preventing such marriage, and thereafter the
legal impediment is removed or disappears, a continued living together of such
parties as husband and wife raises a presumption of a marriage which is not
nullified by the statute ....
See also Note, The Formalities Essential to a Valid Marriage in Indiana, 34 IND. L.J.
643, 662-64 (1959).
If there is sufficient testimony that the couple never held themselves out as married,
they should have little difficulty overcoming the presumption. However, if one party is
deceased, the Dead Man's Statute may make it extremely difficult to overcome the pre-
sumption.
Another confusing twist in the law of common law marriage is that some states
recognize the doctrine'only in limited circumstances. E.g., In re Keig's Estate, 59 Cal.
App. 812, 140 P.2d 163 (1943); Brown's Adm'r v. Brown, 308 Ky. App. 796, 215 S.W.
971 (1958); Damron v. Damron, 301 Ky. App. 636, 192 S.W.2d 741 (1945). While
courts may be willing to recognize a common law spouse who is claiming workman's
compensation benefits they are reluctant to recognize the same spouse's claim against the
decedent's estate. This phenomenon is discussed in Stein, Common-Law Marriage: Its
History and Certain Contemporary Problems, 9 J. FAm. L. 271 (1969).
For these reasons a defense or offense of common law marriage is not likely to
succeed, although, because of the unsettled state of the law, the possibility of course exists.
(Vol. 50:39
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been cautious, courts have enforced a variety of a.greements, including
partnerships, trusts, agreements to pool funds and share property, and
agreements to pay for services. In many instances, such approaches
produce inequitable results. In every instance prediction of the final
outcome is difficult.
If the evidence establishes an express partnership between the
parties, courts will apply the established law of partnership.25 In
Fernandez v. Garza,28 an elderly couple lived together for ten years.
Initially both parties contributed rental residential property, using the
profits for their support and the acquisition of additional property. The
Supreme Court of Arizona held that the agreement to acquire property
and divide profits established the essential elements of a partnership.
Courts have found an implied partnership based on the circum-
stances surrounding the relationship.2" In several cases, however, the
claim of an express partnership has failed due to insufficient evidence.
Generally, if the couple has organized a commercial venture for profit,
the partnership approach, assuming it can be proved, provides for the
orderly disposition of property.2" If no commercial venture exists, this
25 E.g., Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P.2d 260 (1C60) ; Mitchell v. Fish, 97
Ark. 444, 134 S.W. 940 (1911).
The UNIFORMS PARTNERSHIP AcT § 40 provides in part:
In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution, the following
rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
(a) The assets of the partnership are:
I. The partnership property,
II. The contributions of the partners necessary for te payment of all the
liabilities specified in clause (b) of this paragraph.
(b) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment as
follows:
I. Those owing to creditors other than partners,
II. Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits,
III. Those owing to partners in respect of capital,
IV. Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
Forty-five states have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. Am. JUL 2D DESK
BOoK, Doc. No. 129 (Supp. 1974).
2688 Ariz. 214, 354 P.2d 260 (1960).
2 7 E.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972). It may be
more difficult to prove an implied partnership between illicit cohabitants than between
ordinary people in business because of the court's reluctance to sanction the illicit rela-
tionship. The Supreme Court of Washington followed this practice prior to Thornton,
supra. See 48 WAsH. L. REv. 635, 639 (1973).
28 E.g., Moralez v. Velez, 18 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1927) ; Latrc.nica v. Gennoni, 205 Cal.
559, 271 P. 1054 (1928).
For example, in Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P.2d 260 (1960), the parties
operated a real estate business. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864
(1972), involved a ranching operation.
Partnership is a branch of our commercial law; it has dex eloped in connection
with a particular business association, and it is, therefore, essential that the
operation of the act should be confined to associations orgardzed for profit.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 6, Official Comment
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approach is seldom effective in resolving disputes."
Courts have also enforced agreements to pool earnings and to share
property. A typical case is Barlow v. Collins3" in which the parties
illicitly cohabited for eight years while maintaining separate jobs. When
differences arose the man left, taking with him the contents of their
joint bank account. The woman sued, alleging the parties had made an
oral agreement to pool earnings and share accumulated property. Re-
jecting defendant's contention that no agreement had been made, the
court ordered the bank account divided equally.
Pooling agreements, however, must be express and will not be
implied." As discussed earlier, the existence of such agreements may
be difficult to prove. 2 Especially if the testimony is in conflict, the
moral attitude of the trier of fact, conscious or not, may color the deci-
sion. Because only express agreements are enforced, the class of dis-
putes in which this approach provides guidance is narrow."
Where a party furnishes all or part of the consideration, but title
to the property is in the other party, courts have employed the doctrines
of resulting and constructive trusts to determine ownership. 4  The
typical case occurs when the nontitled party contributes funds to the
purchase of real property, and subsequently claims an equitable
interest." In order to establish a resulting trust, however, the nontitled
29 A party alleging the existence of a partnership is still vulnerable to the defense
of illegality. See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.
30 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d 64 (1959).
31 Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953) ; Garcia v. Venegas, 106
Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).3 2 See notes 4-5 supra & text accompanying.
33 The requirement that agreements be express ignores reality. It is inconceivable
that extended cohabitations exist without agreements, just as it is doubtful that a couple
suddenly awakens one day to find themselves sharing the same household. The relation-
ship is more likely a series of tacit agreements which may never be expressed. When
courts decline to imply agreements from the surrounding circumstances, the law is at
odds with reality. Query whether such a policy is designed as punishment for what is
considered immoral conduct.
34 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRusTs § 74 (5th ed.
1973) describe a resulting trust:
Where one pays the consideration for a transfer of real or personal property,
but has the title taken in the name of another, it is presumed or inferred that
the payor intended the grantee to be a trustee for the payor.
On the other hand, according to Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y.
380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919) :
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest,
equity converts him into a trustee ....
35 E.g., Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618, 32 So. 2d 273 (1947) ; Orth v. Wood,
354 Pa. 121, 47 A.2d 140 (1946) ; Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827
(1951).
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party must overcome the presumption that parties intend to dispose of
property in the exact manner in which it is titled.36 Courts require proof
of resulting trusts to be "beyond a reasonable doubt" '37 or even "Clear,
explicit, unequivocal, precise, convincing and indubitable." 8 In addi-
tion, recovery has been denied where the claimant failed to establish
the precise amount of the purchase price contributed by each party.3"
Because trust doctrine recognizes only actual monetary contributions
toward the acquisition of property, and then only upon a strong show-
ing of proof, it is of limited utility.4"
In the absence of an express agreement neither party may recover
the value of services rendered.4 Specifically, housekeeping and home-
making services will not create an interest in property acquired during
the relationship." In Willis v. Willis43 the couple illicitly cohabited for
almost eight years. The man owned a rooming house and tavern where
the woman worked as a hostess, singer, and housekeeper. When the
cohabitation ended, the woman sued alleging an iniplied promise to pay
for her services. The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the trial
court's refusal to compensate the woman for her services.
Not only does the relationship as husband and wife negative that of
a master and servant, but such cohabitation, being in violation of
principles of morality and chastity, and so against public policy, the
law will not imply a promise to pay for services rendered under
such circumstances.
44
While the law normally implies a promise to pay from the rendition and
acceptance of services, courts have held that a contrary presumption is
created by illicit relations between the parties."
Traditional approaches to the resolution of disputes over owner-
ship of property acquired during illicit cohabitation have several short-
as Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948). For a detailed dis-
cussion of this case, see 48 ,VAsH. L. REv. 635 (1973).
37 Smith v. Smith, 108 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1959).
38A Wosche v. Kraning, 353 Pa. 481, 46 A.2d 220 (1946).
30 McQuin v. Rice, 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 199 P.2d 742 (1943).
40 A further problem is that by recognizing only actual monetary contributions, in-
equity results. Consider the situation where real property is purchased and titled in one
party, although both parties contribute their labor toward the improvement of the prop-
erty. The appreciation from their joint effort benefits only the titled party.
41Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 110 Adv. Cal. App. 623, 243 P.2d 561 (1952);
Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950) ; In re Estate of
Thompson, 337 Ill. App. 290, 85 N.E.2d 840 (1949).
42 E.., Gjurich v. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 P. 464 (1913).
4348 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935).
44Id. at 437, 49 P.2d at 681.
45 Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
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comings. First, the legal doctrines were developed for application to
arm's-length business dealings. While such an approach may provide
equitable results where the partners to the illicit relationship are actually
business partners, it ignores the broad class of cases where no traditional
business motives exist. Second, the general requirement that agreements
be express often raises insurmountable problems of proof for the party
claiming an interest in property. Finally, the refusal of courts to recog-
nize the value of services contributed produces a harsh result in that
the party contributing household and often child-rearing services is
left without relief.
The overall effect of a business approach is usually easy to predict.
Those relationships which resemble business ventures receive orderly
and predictable results, while those relationships which resemble a
traditional marriage, particularly where one party plays a domestic role,
do not. 6 Thus, if the parties cannot characterize their relationship in
a business context, the law will not intervene. Clearly, the manner in
which courts have traditionally resolved disputes requires rethinking.
Suggested Approaches
There are several ways in which courts could avoid harsh results
when resolving disputes over ownership of property acquired during
illicit cohabitation. Most importantly, any reappraisal will require the
recognition that illicit sexual relations are of minor legal significance,
especially in light of the larger legal responsibilities associated with the
normal day-to-day activities of running a household. Further, courts
must recognize that public morality is not served by pursuing a policy
which rewards one party at the expense of the other."7 Moreover, when
courts refuse to resolve disputes, opposing parties are left to pursue
self-help. This often means the stronger will prevail, with an even
greater potential for inequitable and unjust results.
Courts could pursue two different tacks to achieve more equitable
46 Clearly, women assuming a domestic role receive a more favorable distribution of
property under the marriage laws than under the business venture approach.
47 In terms of legal consequences, one party to an illicit cohabitation is likely to en-
joy the best of both worlds. The wage-earning, property-acquiring party will often have
title to the property acquired during the cohabitation while receiving domestic services
from the other party, who acquires no interest in the property and receives no credit for
the value of the services. Justice Curtis, dissenting in Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681,
687, 134 P.2d 761, 764 (1943) stated:
Just because the man who in the instant case was equally guilty, earned the money
to buy the property, should not bar the woman from any rights at all in the
property, although her services made the acquisition possible. Such a rule gives
all the advantages to be gained from such a relationship to the man with no
burdens.
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results. Theoretically, illicit cohabitants exist in the limbo between
marriage partners and business partners. Since each of these statuses
has well-developed law for the disposition of property, characteriza-
tion of illicit cohabitation as similar to either status would provide an
orderly guide for disposition."
One approach would be characterization of illicit cohabitation as
closely akin to marriage. Analogous to illicit cohabitation is the situation
where a couple, unaware of a legal impediment, bel'eves they are validly
married. In those cases courts generally hold that a party acting in the
good faith belief that a valid marriage exists acqv.ires an equitable in-
terest in joint acquisitions. 9 In addition, the law in this situation recog-
nizes the value of domestic services so that both parties acquire an
interest in the property."0
Of course the only difference between couples who are not validly
married due to an impediment and those couples who are illicitly co-
habiting is that the first couples think they are married. While of course
neither couple is married, the disposition of property between the couple
who thought they were married proceeds in a more equitable fashion.5
48 Of course, one could postulate a new status to resolve this difficulty. But prac-
tically, it is doubtful that any court would go so far as to affront the legislatively sanc-
tioned institution of marriage. Nor would it necessarily be practical to create unneces-
sary complexity.
49 Reger v. Reger, 242 Ind. 302, 177 N.E.2d 901 (1961). See Feig v. Bank of Italy
Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 218 Cal. 54, 58, 21 P.2d 421, 422 (1933) : "[Where the
husband] innocently and in good faith believed himself at all tiries to be the lawful hus-
band of the decedent, he is entitled to an equitable apportionmtnt of the gains made by
their joint efforts." See also Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 P. 1088 (1920);
Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746, 52 So. 2d 624 (1951).
But independently of the statute of divorce, we think the court had authority to
decree, not only an annulment of the marriage, but also the division of the prop-
erty which had been jointly accumulated by the parties. It vas an equitable pro-
ceeding and, within its equity power, the district court had full jurisdiction to
give adequate relief to the parties. The division that was made was eminently
equitable and just.
Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 219, 96 P. 1079, 1081-82, q,)lnUg Werner v. Werner,
59 Kan. 399, 402, 53 P. 127, 128 (1898).50E.g., Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d E01 (1942). Even where
courts are willing to make a "fair and equitable" disposition of property, the treatment
falls short of the protections afforded by divorce statutes because neither party is liable
for support or alimony. The courts have found a middle ground which produces equit-
able results while preserving the state-sanctioned institution of marriage as the favored
status.
51 In some cases the "spouse" seeking relief believed in good faith the marriage was
valid while the other knew all along it was invalid. Yet in pro viding a "fair and equit-
able" settlement, courts have passed up an opportunity to puniih the bad faith partner.
Compare illicit cohabitation where both parties know that no v ilid marriage exists, but
where courts allow a result that punishes one party while re.\ arding the other. E.g.,




The presence of "good faith" or "bad faith" should not justify different
treatment in these two situations. This is especially true where a "fair
and equitable" settlemient is afforded although only one party acted in
good faith. In Reese v. Reese,52 a couple lived together for 40 years.
While one party knew the marriage was invalid because he was pre-
viously married and not divorced, the other learned of the previous
marriage after 34 years. Thus for six years the parties cohabited in
"bad faith." Nevertheless, the court upheld a fair and equitable ac-
counting of property upon the termination of the relationship, indicat-
ing that "bad faith" is not such a salient factor, or at least'not an insur-
mountable barrier.
The other approach would be to characterize illicit cohabitation as
an economic venture. 3 This characterization would leave intact the
traditional notion that illicit cohabitation alone does not create any
interest in the earnings and accumulations of the other party."' To
varying degrees, households formed by illicit cohabitants are in fact
economic ventures. At a minimum there are economic advantages to
sharing food and shelter expenses.5" By excluding domestic services
from the definition of illicit cohabitation, the value of those services
could be recognized as a contribution toward the business venture.56
Similarly, a broad view of the economic nature of acquiring property
and maintaining a household supports the same equitable result.57
52 132 Kan. 438, 295 P. 690 (1931).
53 While some courts claim to be doing exactly this, such proclamations are dubious
in light of the burden of proof imposed. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
54 justice Traynor, in Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 684, 134 P.2d 761, 762-63,
(1943), stated the general rule:
The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a woman living with a
man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married to him
acquires by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings
and accumulations during the period of their relationship. It has already been
answered in the negative.
55 This is essentially what college roommates are doing. It is usually cheaper for
two people to live together than for two to live alone. It would indeed seem unlikely
that one roommate would claim an interest in a stereo which the other purchased merely
because they were living together at the time. In short, cohabitation alone would not
create an interest in property.
56 Justice Peters, dissenting in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 671, 371 P.2d 329, 338,
21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 602 (1962), urged a narrow construction of illicit cohabitation: "[T]he
quoted rule merely holds that the plaintiff is not entitled to share in their accumulations
by reason of the 'cohabitation alone,' and Mr. Justice Traynor, speaking for the majority,
was very careful to so limit the rule."
7 Justice Curtis, dissenting in Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 686-87, 134 P.2d
761, 764 (1943) suggested:
Unless it can be argued that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper, and
homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that if, when she contributes
money to the purchase of property, her interest will be protected, then when
she contributes her services in the home, her interest in property accumulated
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If both parties are financially independent-for example wage
earners and property accumulators in their own right-then the economic
venture would not justify the creation of mutual property interests."
But as economic interdependence increases, mutual interests in property
acquired during cohabitation arise. On one hand both parties could be
partners in a business venture outside the household; on the other hand
one party could function economically outside the household while the
other performs domestic services at home. Although a division of labor
exists in the latter situation, a common purpose rernains."
Characterization of illicit cohabitation as an economic venture
should not depend on the existence of an express agreement:
Obviously, if the two were not illegally living together, the woman
could recover. In that event it would be a plain business relation-
ship and a contract would be implied. Illicit cohabitation does not
invalidate an otherwise valid relationship. The man is not entitled
to benefit from such nonwifely services simply because the two have
illegally cohabitated. °
By implying an agreement the parties are treated as any other joint
venturers, without regard to the illicit cohabitation "1 Judge Anderson,
dissenting in Morales v. Ielez 2 urged the above approach:
Lack of chastity does not invalidate otherwise legal business rela-
should be protected.
See also note 47 supra.58 Where economic cooperation is minimal between the parti!s, they are in essentially
the same position as college roommates. The legal consequences should be the same:
living together should not in itself create any mutual property interests.
59 In effect the party operating outside the household is saved either the time or ex-
pense of maintaining a household. If he lived alone he would hire someone to maintain
his household or do it himself. When parties cohabitate, an e,:onomic unit exists with
both parties' labor directed toward its success. A division of labor between the parties
should not destroy the common purpose.
60 Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 672, 371 P.2d 329, 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 602
(1962) (Peters, J., dissenting).
61 This notion has been a persistent theme of many of the dissenting opinions found
in cases dealing with illicit cohabitation. For example, see Justica Peters' dissent in id. at
672, 371 P.2d at 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 602. See also Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681,
685, 134 P.2d 761, 764 (1943) (Curtis, J., dissenting) ; Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252,
217 N.W. 192 (1927).
In Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 314, 116 S.V. 43, 46 (1909), the court sup-
ported this position:
If she and Thomas Jefferson were working together to a common purpose and
the proceeds of labor performed by them became the joint property of the two,
then she would occupy the position that a man would have occupied in relation
to Thomas Jefferson under the same circumstances; each ,. ould own the prop-
erty acquired in proportion to the value of his labor contributed to the acquisition
of it.
62 18 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1927).
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tions. Their unchaste relations were, on this record, a mere incident
of their association for business purposes. . . . Rights accruing out
of labor and property embarked in a joint venture are not destroyed
by the existence of unchaste sex relations between the joint ven-
turers.63
In short, an approach which emphasizes the economic realities of
illicit cohabitation, allowing property to be distributed considering the
value of capital contributions, the value of services, and a fair share
of the profits, may be the best solution to these disputes.6 '
CONCLUSION
The failure of illicit cohabitants to anticipate the eventual dissolu-
tion of their relationship will often leave the disposition of jointly
acquired property to the unsettled common law. Many potential prob-
lems could be avoided if the parties initially agree to a framework for
the orderly disposition of property acquired throughout the relation-
ship. Traditionally, judicial resolution of these disputes has been marked
by an unwillingness to develop a body of law for the equitable distribu-
tion of property. Thus, the number of cases where adequate relief has
been granted is small. To correct this, courts should treat illicit co-
habitation as an essentially economic venture in which the disposition of
property acquired during the relationship should take into consideration
the value of capital contributions, the value of services, and a fair
share of the profits.
ROBERT C. ANGERMEIER
6 Id. at 521.
64 Treating illicit cohabitation as a "joint venture" would produce the desired result
without straining the rather flexible doctrine. See Davis v. Webster, 136 Ind. App. 286,
198 N.E.2d 883 (1964).
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